

Indo-Chinese Relations in a Novel Outlook

Dr Mohd Abass Itoo

Abstract:

Plans of the urbanized world carry on to affect the home as well as foreign plans of China and India in the post-Cold War period. The US war against fear in Afghanistan has drawn China closer to the US. This has set new parameters for Sino-Indian connection. Financial reasons violent the relations among nations in the 1990s, but the scare of fear has forged a global coalition and middle powers have few options to choose self-governing plans.

Introduction

Post-colonial state and nation-building in Asian countries essential friendly ties with the developed western states, rather the two imperialist. But the political cost of such connection was serious as the grow states could hardly escape their involvement in the global embassy game. Maoist China had primacy of ideology in its state building course but it had responded to the changing international relations since the last half century. The intrusion of the imperialist in the Asian affairs generated common planned concerns and misperceptions in the bilateral relationship of these two countries. India and China had fairly good relationship in the years following India's independence. But the weakness of their relationship became evident when they made different responses to the involvement of the Superpowers in the Asian region and outer.

The post-1962 relations of these two countries were influenced by the 'China-Pak alliance' and after 1971 by the 'Chin-Pak-US axis' against India. After 1972, Bangladesh was carved out of Pakistan, Sikkim was complex with India, the first nuclear test was conducted in 1974 which nervous China- Indian relations further. India had made earnest efforts¹ to modify its relations with China soon after the nuclear tests were conducted in 1974, paving the way for the organization of diplomat relationship after a lapse of one-and-a half decades. The icy association between both the countries was becoming warm after the collapse of the Soviet Union when the Cold War geographical boundaries began to disappear.

The paper attempts to explore the areas in which both China and India have been trying to get better their relations as a response to the changes in the international sphere in the post-Cold War period and the future directions of their association. The first section analyses the factors that determined the improvement in Sino-Indian relationship in the 1990s and the second section focuses on main issues, which may decide their future association.

Efforts for mutual Relations

In the 1950s Sino-Indian connections were strained mainly due to the defensive issue² and the Chinese annexation of Tibet. Pakistan had been successful in drawing China closer which multiply India's problems. The military ties between China and Pakistan have progress since India was under fire as the common enemy. With the end of the Cold War, China is helpful to the changes in the international sphere. Along with other factors its aspirations for regional and global supremacy have facilitate a conciliatory approach in its association with the Asian countries including India.³ Inherent in China's anxiety is the military ability of India which it perceives to be an effort to catch up with China and upset the strategic balance in the area.

Normalization of Diplomatic Relations

The end of the Cold War has given a new measurement to Sino-Indian relationship when the peace process was expedite with Chinese Premier Li Peng's visit to India, in 1991. His visit facilitate the reopening of the Chinese Consulate General in Mumbai, in 1992 and the Indian Consulate General in Shanghai, in 1993. The Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao visited China in 1993 when the calm and Tranquility accord was signed which was helpful towards reaching a solution to the China- Indian border dispute. During President Jiang Zemin's visit to India an agreement was signed for partial demilitarization of the doubtful border of 4,500 km. Both the countries endorsed that neither India nor China "shall use force against the other by any resources and seek independent military support". The agreement has its significance in forging a new relationship between both the countries, a 'constructive cooperation' though it does not indicate total dispersion of troops from the

border or a constructive discussion on ending the dispute, which is the core to improve relationship stuck between both the countries.

In 1994, the then Indian Vice-President K.R. Narayanan visited China and, this was joint by the visit of Qian Qichen, the Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister to India, when a congregation of agreement be signed which included generalization of the process for visa application. In 1995, the Chairman of the status Committee of the NPC (National People's Congress) Qiao Shi visited India. Several accords were signed during the visit for promote trade and economic cooperation as well as intensification mutual support on international issues but the most important was the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of realControl on the China and India Border. The momentum was maintained by Wei Jianxing's (the Secretary of the Central group Secretariat of the CPC) visit, in 1997.

The misperceptions created after India's second nuclear test in 1998 were it seems that dispelled by the political efforts made during Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh's visit to China, in 1999 when the two sides stated not to treat the other as a threat and strengthen their relationship on the basis of the Five major beliefs of Cooperation. The dialogue process was resumed and the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the diplomatic relationship flanked by both the countries was famous on April 1, 2000. The process sustained during Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji's visit to India, in January 2002, through wide ranging debate on bilateral issues as well as global issues covering the tension shaped on the Indo-Pak border, the radical attack on the Indian Parliament, and his statement that "China is different to terrorism in all its forms, no substance when or where occurs or who it is bound for against."⁵ Indian Prime Minister, A.B. Vajpayee reiterates that "China does not pose any threat to India nor does India believe that China regard India as a threat."⁶ The stabilization of political relationship is well underway with the exchange of maps and the expand Joint operational Group (JWG) parleys, the most new held in November 2002.

Financial collaboration

India and China have responded absolutely to the priorities of the post-Soviet world by

opening up their economies, though China precede India in its attempt to liberalise its economy. Together the countries have expedited the process of integration in the global economy as well as bilateral economic cooperation. But relative figures for both the countries indicate China's superiority in several sectors.⁷ The joint grant of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment has greater than before Sino- Indian bilateral trade. On February 22, 2000 China agreed to accord India on a non-reciprocal basis, tariff concessions on a number of substance as part of its pre-WTO entry indication.

Though India is exporting some items to China, the fear in commerce circles is that the comparatively cheaper Chinese goods might displace Indian goods in the global market due to their lesser cost. Only in software can India compete with China. But even that sector may be overtake in view of China's impressive record of export of high-tech crop.⁸ Within a period of two decades China has emerge as a major world player in planned and economic conditions.⁹ The entry of China in the WTO on December 11, 2001 has raised apprehension about crash on Indian agriculture, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, banking, assurance and the IT sectors. Indian business is helpful by directly setting up its units in China as well as importing goods from it.

Universal Perspectives

The key factors which shape the home as well as overseas policies of both the countries in post-Cold War period are their insight of the altering contours of world politics, agreement on several issues, the desire for friendship based on domestic priorities and house changes happening in the international sphere. China's foreign policy emphasizes military security and national sovereignty, economic prosperity and social welfare.¹⁰ Therefore, it has focused on establishing operational relationship with as many states as possible, especially in the neighbourhood. Economic interest is a significant motivation behind expanding the network of diplomatic relations and strengthening bilateral relations.¹¹ The shift in the priorities of its foreign policy is due to the influence of non-governmental domestic actors and pragmatic approach based on consultation and consensus building. China has unspoken that India cannot be prevented from being a dominant player in the Indian subcontinent and from

creating room for its larger role in Asia. This can be one of the reasons for its positive outlook to solve several debatable issues and for apparently understanding the nuclear doctrine of India, the minimum nuclear avoidance and other security related issues. China's priorities are in the East and South-East, the South China Sea and beyond, which it could not pursue efficiently if its relationship with India are hostile.

China's new mood for appointment with India in the new past indicates its reconsideration of safety relations with India perhaps due to its fear of Pakistani participation in Central Asia and the Caucasus in which China has profitable and strategic interests.¹² The post-September 11 scenario has changed the attitude of China towards violence and particularly after December 13, 2001 China has not opposed India's stand on terrorism.¹³

One important reason of China's distorted posture is the ethnic and religious tension in the Xinjiang region.¹⁴ China is also scared by the military presence of the US in South Asia through Pakistan. India has therefore become strategically significant for China because India could be a dependable partner in its endeavour to denounce hemispheric dominance by any one power. Secondly, India's technological advantage in computer software will be an important sector for Sino-Indian collaboration. "The fast changing global strategic environment will be the defining example for the swap of plans of action among China and India.

At the moment, the following significant factors guide the national interests of both the countries:

- Promotion of export-oriented trade
- Guard against terrorist attacks
- Internal stability and prosperity
- Cooperation rather than argument in foreign relations

Future Directions

The post-Soviet world system is characterized by merger of geographical limits in the overall perspective of financial integration. The Cold War rivalry between two different political systems is no more the limit for choice of allies. Even the US and Russia have come closer and Russia is included in the NATO executive.¹⁵ The challenging diplomacy has been replaced

by consensus and meeting. Since 1999, the menace of terrorism has coalesced India and the US as well as the US and China. The original mood of engagement between India and China has been partial by the developments in the international sphere.

Conclusion

The institutions and personnel involved in frame China's foreign policy are not unanimous about India's reply to the changed bearing of China. Recent studies highlight either a gloomy or a vivid view of Sino-Indian relations.²³ There is also anxiety that "if there will be a new Cold War between US and China, India might come to live in the same place in the US security calculus that China had throughout the US-Soviet Cold War from 1971 to 1989."²⁴ At the moment it is reckless to draw extreme conclusions but the steady development of events underline a better relationship flanked by both the countries. While supporting and economic relations will move onward in a better perspective, China is doubtful to give the same weight to Pakistan next to India as it had given previous to the war in Afghanistan. The cause being the danger from essential Islamic fundamentalists reportedly trained in Pakistan. Though the marital compulsions of China have pressed it closer to India, the outside factors will play a viable role in determining the future course of their connection. The kindred of the two Asian powers with the US and Russia will have a decisive impact in determining their future affiliation. currently, both China and India are relying like crazy on Russian military technology and equipment for modernization of their resistance systems. Russia's kindred with the US would irritate China's vision of a multipolar world. How the nuclear powers accept India's nuclearisation and how China perceives India's nuclear programme are imperative determinants for stabilization of their friendly association. Trade relations, particularly move of military tackle and skill from the West, will have a marvelous impact on following decision-making in both the countries. India's nuclear programme, the disputed borders, the direction of its future chase of strategic partnership with the United States and Russia, the future of Tibet and Tibetan émigrés and more lately India's statement to hold naval movements in the South China Sea will decide the future course of the Sino-Indian association.



References/Endnotes

1. After the border war with China in 1962, India had attempted to normalise its relations with China but ambassadorial relations between the two countries were established only in 1976. Following A.B. Vajpayee's (then India's minister for external affairs) visit to China in 1979, it agreed to terminate assistance to the secessionist groups in the North-East of India and preserve peace along the LAC. Before 1981 the Chinese Vice-Premier cum Foreign Minister, Huang Hua visited India and in 1984, both the countries signed trade agreements. Since then the dialogue between China and India entered a new phase as eight rounds of talks were held till the Indian Prime Minister visited China in 1988. But the LAC continued to be the de facto international boundary for both the countries though till 1970 China gained some Indian territory and claimed large tracts of Indian territory, which was also claimed by India.
2. The disputed areas in the India-China border are about 125,000 sq. km out of which 90,000 is in the eastern sector, 2,000 in the middle sector and 33,000 in the western sector. For details see "The Relation between China and India" at www.china.org, Embassy of the People's Republic of China.
3. China has adopted a two-pronged approach in dealing with territorial issues. If the issue is marginal, it has followed a policy of amicable settlement and pursues its broader objectives, which it has followed in its relations with Russia. But where the territorial dispute cannot be solved for its advantage it has avoided a quick solution which has been followed in its territorial disputes with India.
4. Among other reasons threat perceptions are due to China's activities in the South Asian region, military assistance to Pakistan, military build-up in Tibet, road building and visit of Chinese warships in Myanmar, Chinese naval interest in the Pakistani port of Gwadar.
5. China Agrees with India's Stand on Terrorism. Indian Express. January 14, 2002.
6. "Sino-Indian Relations Continue to Gain Momentum: Indian President." People's Daily Online. February 25, 2002; "Premier Zhu's Visit Promotes Sino-Indian Trust: Vice Foreign Minister." People's Daily Online. January 18, 2002, at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200201/18/eng2002048.88915.shtml>; Jing dong Yuan, "Sino-Indian Relations: A New Beginning." Asia Times Online. January 19, 2002 at www.asiatimes.chinese.com.
7. This can be assessed from its domestic savings which crossed 40 per cent compared to India's meagre 25 per cent. Its domestic production is \$1,100 billion and per capita domestic production is \$887 billion whereas the comparative figures for India are \$426 billion and \$424 billion respectively. Within a span of twenty years i.e., 1979-99, China's export has reached 18 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product, including it within the top ten exporters in the world. The share of industrial production has been 50 per cent in China whereas in India it is about 23 per cent. Foreign investment in China is about \$40 billion but in India it is only about \$3 billion. Its income from

exports is six times more and the foreign currency reserve is about three times more than that of India. Professional Worker. August 2001, 10(2) 1-5.

8. Other measures for improving commercial relations like setting up of joint economic groups at the ministerial level, sub-committees on science and technology, agreements on cooperation on coal mining, a civil aviation agreement on direct services, cooperation on Doordarshan and Chinese Central TV and Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on maritime transport cooperation (in which the Most Favoured Nation treatment was formalized) are well underway.
9. China's production in the IT sector crossed \$15.7 billion in the first six months of 2000 marking a 48 per cent increase over the same period during 1999, of which computer and telecom hardware alone accounted for 72 per cent. China could-achieve the goal of becoming the third-largest hardware manufacturer in the world because of its government regulations which do not allow any kind of hard-ware component import for local manufacturing. Its policies coupled with consistent pursuit to build a skilled workforce with proficiency in English may threaten India's predominance in international market in the IT sector. China Threatens India's Eminence. Wired News. February 23, 2001.
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